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I. INTRODUCTION
In this short Essay, I consider the team production theory developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout1 from a historical perspective, in three senses. First, does the theory fit the historical use of the
corporate form? Second, can it explain the development of corporation law doctrines? And third, can we place the development of the
theory as such into the intellectual history of corporation theories at
large? I will state my bottom line up front: while I find the team production theory insightful and useful for my historical research, for
teaching corporation law, and for thinking about contemporary corporate problems, I am unable to position the theory in the three
above-mentioned senses: the history of the corporation, the history of
corporation law, and the history of the theory itself.
In this Essay, I first consider the changing function of the corporation. I argue that the corporate form has solved different problems in different periods and different contexts. I do not subscribe to
the assertion that its main aim was or is to solve team production
problems, but I do believe that in some cases this was its aim. I next
discuss the history of legal doctrines and argue that the history of
various corporate law doctrines does not support a coherent switch to
doctrines that uphold the team production theory. At the time when
some doctrines became more supportive of the theory, others undermined it. Third, and finally, I consider the intellectual history of cor*
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poration theories. I argue that the theoretical discourse regarding the
purpose of the corporation is not uniform. One cannot identify clear
timing for the decline of other theories and for the rise of the team
production theory. The team production theory and the agency theory
coexist. As we shall see, they are designed to solve different problems, and, therefore, can coexist in different types of corporations.
II. THE CHANGING FUNCTION OF CORPORATIONS
Let us examine the problems encountered by entrepreneurs and
investors in different historical periods and the solutions the corporation could offer to the various problems. In each of three historical
periods, entrepreneurs and investors faced multiple, multidimensional organizational problems. The problems appeared in a
different mixture in different business contexts. Organizational law
in general, and the corporation in particular, served as the solution to
more than one problem.
A. Business Organization in the Late Middle Ages
To understand the modern corporation, we must begin with the
pre-corporation period. Two main organizational forms were used in
late medieval Europe for organizing multilateral enterprises. One was
the compagnia partnership2 and the other was the commenda partnership.3 I hold that each was more efficient than the other in solving a
different problem. The commenda was good for solving agency problems, while the compagnia was good for solving team production
problems.
1. The Compagnia Partnership
The compagnia developed out of the family business. 4 Once this
was expanded to include more remote relatives as well as employees,
the family firm arrangement was somewhat formalized and legalized.5 It was formalized as the forerunner of the general partnership.6
2. R OBERT S. LOPEZ & IRVING W. R AYMOND , MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN W ORLD : ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 185–211 (2002).
3. See id. at 174–84; Ron Harris, The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian
Trade: The Corporation and the Commenda, 71 J. E CON . B EHAV . & ORG . 606–22 (2009)
[hereinafter Harris, Corporation and the Commenda]; R ON HARRIS , THE B IRTH OF THE
C ORPORATION : E AST AND WEST (forthcoming).
4. L OPEZ & R AYMOND , supra note 2, at 185–86.
5. Id. at 185–211.
6. Id. at 186.
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The term compagnia seems to come from the Latin “cumpanis”,
meaning eating the same bread.7 This is indicative. The compagnia
created strong social and economic ties among the partners.8 They
were supposed to invest labor and to contribute their full time and
efforts. In return, the compagnia provided for them and their families.9 Ties were strengthened by intermarriage. The compagnia was
common in inland towns.10 It was used mainly for artisanal and manufacturing businesses. As I understand it, the bright-line rules that
demanded exclusivity of the partners’ contribution to a single partnership, the physical proximity to enable fuller information, and the
social ties to allow social sanctions, were all well geared to dealing
with team production problems. That is, the organizational form of
the compagnia was structured in a manner that mitigated shirking by
partners. It could identify laziness—the preference for leisure over
labor. It could punish this by deprivation of benefits and profits, and
ultimately by ostracism.11
2. The Commenda Partnership
The commenda developed from employment and sea loan contracts. It was the forerunner of the limited partnership. The basic
commenda was a bilateral contract involving only two parties, a sedentary investing party and a traveling itinerant party. It was used in
maritime trade. The commenda was an equity investment contract,
specifying investments and payoffs. The investing party provided
capital in the form of goods and cash used for the purchase of trade
goods and for travel-related costs. The itinerant party typically did
not invest capital. The traveling merchant controlled the pool of assets invested by the investor and travelled with it to faraway ports or
markets. 12 The commenda was also a labor contract with the traveling
party committing to invest labor, expertise, information, contacts,
and bodily risk. The profits of the commenda were split between the
two parties. In Italy, the investing party often received three-quarters
of the net profits and the traveling party received one-quarter. The
investor conveyed capital to a separate pool.13 In addition, the
7. Id. at 185.
8. Id. at 185–86.
9. Id. at 185–211.
10. Id. at 185–86.
11. This punishment is similar to that of the “mediating hierarchy” theory for dealing
with this kind of problem. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 271.
12. Harris, Corporation and the Commenda, supra note 3, at 609–11.
13. Id.; L OPEZ & R AYMOND , supra note 2, at 174–84.
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commenda was also used in a multilateral version, typically when
several investors invested in the same traveling party. But the fact
that the commenda could be multilateral, and not only bilateral, does
not refute its basic feature: having two classes of partners.14
The main problem that the commenda meant to mitigate was
agency, not team production. The itinerant party was geographically
separated from the investing party; the itinerant party did not work
under direct instructions or supervision.15 Each partner was required
to produce different output, either capital or labor. Their contributions took a different form, different timing, and were made in different locations. No team production had to be dealt with. Rather, the
main problem stemmed from the fact that the investor could not fully
anticipate ex ante the circumstances, opportunities, and risks. There
was a major information asymmetry problem to be dealt with. Solutions included a clear mandate issued by the investor, a reporting obligation by the itinerant party, a fiduciary duty of the traveler to the
investor, and an immunization of the investor from liability to the
deeds of the traveler. 16
Both the compagnia and the commenda were developed in response to the new needs stemming from the commercial revolution in
the Italian towns of the late middle ages. In my view, they were forerunners of different versions of the partnership, the general and the
limited. But the problems they were designed to mitigate were very
different: team production for the compagnia and agency for the
commenda. The ability to solve these different problems made them
fit different types of business activities better: domestic manufacturing for the compagnia and overseas trade for the commenda.
B. Early Business Corporations
In sixteenth-century England, corporations of various sorts were
widespread. For example, organized corporations included the King
himself, cities and boroughs, guilds, universities and colleges, hospitals and other charitable institutions; bishops, deans, and chapters;
and abbots, convents, and other ecclesiastical bodies. The business
corporation, which emerged in England in the sixteenth century, was
built on the old legal conception of the corporation that was first
used in organizing churches, towns, universities, colleges, and
14. Harris, Corporation and the Commenda, supra note 3, at 609–11.
15. Id. at 609–10.
16. Id. at 609–11.
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guilds.17 All these corporations, and others to a considerable degree,
could be incorporated in the same pattern, enjoyed the same powers,
capacities, and privileges, and were subject to the same remedies.
The early joint-stock business corporation was not distinguishable in its legal framework from any other corporation of that era.18
However, it combined the well-known legal conception of the corporation with the novel financial feature of joint stock. The joint-stock
corporation, like the regulated corporation (a corporation modeled
after the guild), and unlike other corporations, aimed at profit maximization. However, unlike the regulated corporation, the joint-stock
corporation traded in only one account. That meant that members
shared not only overheads, but also all the business activities of the
corporation—all profits and losses. In this, the joint-stock corporation was somewhat similar to the general partnership. But while interests in the joint-stock corporation were relatively freely transferable, they were not in the partnership. In addition to the feature of
transferability of interests, the joint-stock corporation, like other corporations but unlike partnerships, was also characterized by a separate legal personality that ensured longevity and a hierarchical organizational structure that enabled concentration of management in the
hands of a governor and directors. Limitation of liability became an
inherent feature of the joint-stock corporation only in the eighteenth
century. Even without limited liability, the joint-stock corporation
was fundamentally different from the partnership and substantially
different in degree, if not in kind, from the regulated corporation.
Did it intend to solve team production problems? The following examples will address this question.
1. The East India Company
The nature of the business of the East India Company (EIC)—
long-distance trade—was similar to that of the typical commenda,
and so was its main organizational challenge.19 In September 1599, a

17. R ON HARRIS, I NDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW : E NTREPRENEURSHIP AND B USINESS
ORGANIZATION , 1720–1844, at 16–19 (2000) [hereinafter HARRIS, I NDUSTRIALIZING ].
18. See id. at 16–19, 32–33, 39–46. Business corporations were mentioned only briefly
in the major eighteenth-century treatise on corporations: S TEWART KYD , A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF C ORPORATIONS (1794). They are also briefly noted in the chapter on corporations in
2 W ILLIAM B LACKSTONE , C OMMENTARIES *458–59, *462–64.
19. See Ron Harris, Law, Finance and the First Corporations, in GLOBAL P ERSPECTIVES
ON THE R ULE OF L AW (James J. Heckman, Robert L. Nelson & Lee Cabatingan eds., 2009);
Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a Cooperation-Enhancing Institu-
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group of London merchants, dominated by members of the Levant
Company, who felt it was crucial for them to enter the Cape Route
trade with Asia in the face of Portuguese and Dutch competition,
held a number of meetings that in retrospect turned out to be the
founding meetings of the English East India Company.20 The EIC
was formed along two parallel tracks: one obtaining a Royal Charter
that incorporated it as a corporate entity and permitted it to enter
trade with new territories; and the other, raising equity capital for
voyages to the East Indies from a large number of passive investors. 21
By employing these parallel tracks, the promoters of the EIC coupled
the familiar legal structure of the corporation with the less familiar
element of joint stock.22
The EIC was formally incorporated as “one body corporate and
politick” on December 31, 1600.23 It was initially formed as a trading
company for a period of fifteen years.24 In fact, it lasted for more
than 250 years and became the territorial governor of India. The
charter of incorporation defined the basic governance structure of the
EIC. This included a Governor, a Deputy Governor, a Committee of
24—also called the “Court of Committees” (and after 1709, the
“Court of Directors”)—and a General Court. The charter granted the
EIC a trade monopoly.25
The promoters of the EIC, and later its directors, were concerned with raising capital for a very costly and risky business enterprise. But asymmetric information created a major obstacle to cooperation. To entice outsiders, the insiders could not rely only on presenting the prospects of oceanic trade with Asia or promising a fair
share of the profits. They had to credibly commit to provide information that would reduce the asymmetry. They had to provide tools
for acting upon the information. An institutional innovation was required to enable this and to raise vast capital from outsiders. Pairing
the financial tool of equity investment in joint stock with the legal
concept of the corporation represented a major innovation. The EIC
tion (Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Harris, Formation], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=874406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.874406.
20. Harris, Law, Finance and the First Corporations, supra note 19, at 159–60.
21. Harris, Formation, supra note 19, at 23–24.
22. Id.
23. C HARTER G RANTED BY Q UEEN ELIZABETH TO THE EAST INDIA C OMPANY , 31
DECEMBER 1600 (1600), available at http://www.sdstate.edu/projectsouthasia/loader.cfm?
csModule=security/getfile&PageID=857407.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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was designed institutionally as it was—coupling a corporation with a
per-voyage equity financial investment—to facilitate cooperation
between insiders and outsiders. To attract external investors, and in
an attempt to offset the lack of liquidity in the absence of an effective
market for shares in 1600 England, the EIC offered them voice. Further, the EIC was designed in a manner that would allow its members
an exit option despite the lack of a preexisting stock market.26 Members of the EIC were given the option to invest, or not to invest, in
any voyage after the first.27 In this sense, the corporation was a club
of potential, though not necessarily actual, investors.28
The EIC was a solution to the agency problem. It allowed outside investors with inferior access to information to monitor the insiders. It allowed the insiders to credibly commit not to expropriate,
lock in, or massively cheat the passive outside investors. The EIC
dealt with a problem not altogether different from the one dealt with
by the commenda. Team production was not a major issue early on.
The early EIC did not have other major constituencies. Creditors
were almost absent. Employees were weak. Asian constituencies
were not taken into account. The Board of Directors did not have to
function as a mediating hierarchy. The Board had to assure outside
investors that the insiders would not defraud them and would not use
their money for purposes not agreed upon. It had to mediate between
principals and agents. The agents—the insiders—were the producing
team; the outsiders—the passive shareholders back in England—had
no skills, no information, and no physical proximity to the team’s
production.
2. The Bank of England
England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 brought about political
stability and commercial opportunities. But it also brought war with
France and growing public expenses.29 To bridge the gap between
26. Harris, Formation, supra note 19, at 31–33.
27. Id. at 23–27, 31–33.
28. The goods offered to club members—a share in the voyage’s profit—was
nonrivalrous because there was in fact no upper bound to investment in a voyage. When more
capital was raised, more ships could be fitted or more goods (mainly silver) could be loaded
on the ships.
29. See generally J OHN B REWER, THE S INEWS OF P OWER: WAR , MONEY AND THE
ENGLISH S TATE , 1688–1783 (1990); J OHN H AROLD C LAPHAM , THE B ANK OF E NGLAND : A
HISTORY (1944); P.G.M. DICKSON , THE F INANCIAL R EVOLUTION IN E NGLAND , A S TUDY IN
THE D EVELOPMENT OF P UBLIC C REDIT , 1688–1756 (1967); Douglass C. North & Barry R.
Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public
Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. E CON . HIST . 803 (1989).
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income taxation and wartime needs, the national debt was dramatically increased in what is known as the Financial Revolution.30 There
were calls for a national or public bank to encourage the propertied
public to lend money to the state via an intermediary. The creditworthiness of the new Dutch King, William III, was so low in London
that it was impossible for the government to borrow the £1,200,000
(at 8%) that it needed.31 To induce subscription to the loan, lenders
were to be incorporated as the Governor and Company of the Bank of
England (Bank), with long-term banking privileges including a corporate monopoly on the issue of notes.32 In return for government
bonds, the lenders subscribed to the equity stock of the new Bank of
England, which in turn lent the Government cash.33
Although the new bank risked its entire capital by lending it to
the government in return for a Royal Charter, the subscription proved
popular. The £1.2 million was raised in twelve days, lent to the government, and half was used to rebuild the navy.34 The Royal Charter
was sealed on July 27, 1694, and the Bank began its role as the government’s banker and debt manager, which it continues doing today.35 The Bank’s early years were dominated by the government’s
pressing demands for finance and the issue of new coinage. The
Bank also embarked upon conventional banking business.36 The
Bank’s notes became a widely accepted currency;37 people seldom
doubted that the “promise to pay”—which then referred to gold coin
of the realm—would be honored. The Bank’s connection with the
government, the scale of its private banking business, and the position it held at the heart of the growing financial system of the City of
London made the Bank a national treasure house and the leading
commercial bank of the day.
The main role of the Governor and the Board was not in the
realm of mitigating agency problems and it was not in the realm of
team production mediation. It was mostly in the realm of asset partitioning.38 It was to ensure that the pool of assets was sufficient for
30. See P.G.M. D ICKSON , supra note 29, at 3–14.
31. Id., at 39–75.
32. Id.; see also North & Weingast, supra note 29, at 820–21.
33. See P.G.M. D ICKSON , supra note 29, at 39–75.
34. Id.; North & Weingast, supra note 29, at 821.
35. See P.G.M. D ICKSON , supra note 29, at 46–57.
36. Id. at 39–75; North & Weingast, supra note 29, at 824–25.
37. North & Weingast, supra note 29, at 827–28.
38. Henry Hansmann, Reinier H. Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the
Firm, 119 H ARV . L. R EV . 1333 (2006).
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servicing the debt. They were not involved in production, but rather
in demarcation and separation. They had to make sure that loans to
the Crown would be in appropriate terms so that insolvency would
not occur and shareholders’ investments would be protected. 39 Insurance companies that were formed during the eighteenth century had a
similar function. These included the London Assurance and the Royal Exchange Assurance, which were marine insurance joint-stock
companies formed in 1720.40 Here again, the main role of the Board
was monitoring pools of assets and demarcating the partitions between such pools. Syndicates such as the Lloyds for marine insurance—in Lloyds Coffee Shop around 1730—and unincorporated insurance companies, such as Phoenix and Equitable Life Insurance
(1756) and Phoenix Fire Insurance Company (1781), were formed.41
These were not corporate entities; they did not have the privilege of
limitation of liability, and they did not create a separate pool of assets from those of their investors.
3. Textile and Iron Firms
Textiles and iron were the leading sectors of the first Industrial
Revolution. They began to revolutionize technologically in the 1760s
and 1770s.42 New technologies in spinning and weaving, such as the
spinning jenny, the spinning mule, the water frame, and eventually,
the cotton mill, changed the cotton industry forever.43 Similarly, the
blast furnace, hot blast, and other improvements in machines and
processes increased the productivity and quality of the iron industry.44 The firms in these leading sectors grew in size from domestic
cottage industries, to more capitalist putting-out systems, and even39. P HYLLIS DEANE , THE I NDUSTRIAL R EVOLUTION IN ENGLAND , 1700–1914, at 185
(1969).
40. See P.G.M. D ICKSON , supra note 29, at 446–51.
41. H ARRIS , INDUSTRIALIZING , supra note 17; B REWER , supra note 29, at 194.
42. See generally M. J. DAUNTON , P ROGRESS AND P OVERTY : A N E CONOMIC AND S OCIAL
HISTORY OF B RITAIN , 1700–1850 (1995); P AT HUDSON , THE GENESIS OF INDUSTRIAL
C APITAL : A S TUDY OF THE WEST R IDING WOOL AND T EXTILE I NDUSTRY , C . 1750–1850
(1986); C HARLES K. HYDE , TECHNOLOGICAL C HANGE AND THE B RITISH IRON INDUSTRY ,
1700–1870 (1977); D AVID S. L ANDES, THE UNBOUND P ROMETHEUS: T ECHNOLOGICAL
C HANGE AND INDUSTRIAL D EVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE P RESENT
(1969); R.C. M ICHIE , THE LONDON AND NEW Y ORK S TOCK E XCHANGES 1850–1914 (2012);
J OEL MOKYR , T HE B RITISH INDUSTRIAL R EVOLUTION : A N E CONOMIC P ERSPECTIVE (1999);
J OEL M OKYR , THE L EVER OF R ICHES : TECHNOLOGICAL C REATIVITY AND E CONOMIC
P ROGRESS (1990).
43. L ANDES , supra note 42, at 42, 81–113; see HUDSON , supra note 42.
44. L ANDES , supra note 42, at 81–113; HYDE , supra note 42.
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tually to factories and town factories. These firms were team production firms, much like the Italian compagnias of earlier centuries.
Their teams involved inventors, entrepreneurs, cotton and iron suppliers, credit providers, laborers, production floor managers, wholesalers and retailers, and supporting communities. Nevertheless, textiles and iron were organized throughout the Industrial Revolution—
a full century—in the form of family firms and partnerships. 45 Team
production problems in these leading and crucial sectors were addressed without resort to the corporation as a form of organization.
4. Railway Companies
The railway sector followed the path paved by the canal companies in the eighteenth century and, from its origins, was wholly based
on the joint-stock form.46 It made a slow start in the early 1820s with
the world’s first steam-powered public line, the Stockton & Darlington Railway.47 But it really gathered momentum only after the completion of the thirty-mile long Liverpool and Manchester Railway in
1830.48 New company formations peaked in two boom periods, one
between 1834 and 1837—with the formation of 88 companies—and
the other beginning in 1843 and culminating toward the end of the
decade.49 Altogether, 216 Railway Acts passed in Parliament between
1820 and 1844.50 The total capital of railway companies traded in
London was over £57 million in 1843.51 Between 1830 and 1850,
some 6,000 miles of public railway were built in Britain, in what is
known as the Railway Mania.52 By 1850, the annual number of passengers transported reached 68 million, and by 1870, it had reached

45. See generally P.L. C OTTRELL , INDUSTRIAL F INANCE , 1830–1914: THE F INANCE AND
ORGANIZATION OF ENGLISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1980); R OGER LLOYD -J ONES &
M.J. LEWIS , MANCHESTER AND THE AGE OF THE F ACTORY : THE B USINESS S TRUCTURE OF
C OTTONOPOLIS IN THE INDUSTRIAL R EVOLUTION (1988).
46. See generally S EYMOUR A. B ROADBRIDGE , S TUDIES IN R AILWAY EXPANSION AND
THE C APITAL M ARKET IN E NGLAND : 1825–1873 (1970); T.R. G OURVISH , R AILWAYS AND THE
B RITISH ECONOMY : 1830–1914 (1980); M.C. R EED , INVESTMENT IN R AILWAYS IN B RITAIN:
1820–1844—A S TUDY IN THE D EVELOPMENT OF THE C APITAL MARKET (1975).
47. R EED, supra note 46, at 4–14.
48. Id.
49. H ARRIS , I NDUSTRIALIZING , supra note 17, at 220; REED , supra note 46, at 1–28.
50. H ARRIS , INDUSTRIALIZING , supra note 17, at 221 (see the total in Table 8.3).
51. R EED, supra note 46, at 46 tbl.8.
52. J ACKSON J. S PIELVOGEL , WESTERN C IVILIZATION , VOLUME II: S INCE 1500, at 683–
85 (7th ed. 2010). T. R. Gourvish, Railways 1830–70: The Formative Years, in T RANSPORT
IN V ICTORIAN B RITAIN 57, 57–58 (Michael J. Freeman & Derek H. Aldcrof eds., 1991).
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322 million.53 This was the fastest growth any economic sector had
ever experienced.54
From the start, the railway companies were very big. Network
considerations led to a very rapid merger movement. The Liverpool
& Manchester Railway opened to the public in 1830.55 The Grand
Junction Railway from Warrington to Birmingham was incorporated
in 1833 and opened in 1837.56 In 1845, it merged with the Liverpool
& Manchester Railway. The line then merged with the London and
Birmingham Railway (opened 1838) and the Birmingham and Manchester Railway to form the London and North Western Railway on
1846.57 It grew on a colossal scale, never before seen, due to the rapid growth of the sector as a whole and the mergers of the railway
companies. By the middle of the nineteenth century, it had capital in
the millions of pounds, tens of thousands of shareholders, nearly a
thousand miles of rails with dozens of stations, hundreds of locomotives, thousands of carriages, tens of thousands of employees, and
millions of passengers.58
Companies like the London and Northwestern Railway had
many constituencies, including shareholders of ordinary and preferred shares, bondholders, adjacent landowners, passengers, freight
customers, constructors, suppliers and service providers, executives,
engineers, drivers, maintenance workers, salespersons, tort claimants,
and many other types of employees, accountants, lawyers, and
more.59 According to Chandler, the large British and American railways were the first modern business enterprises. 60 The directors of
these giant railway companies did not deal with bilateral agency
problems or with the management of separate pools of assets. They
primarily coordinated highly complex team production projects.
53. S USIE L. S TEINBACH , UNDERSTANDING THE VICTORIANS: P OLITICS, C ULTURE AND
S OCIETY IN NINETEENTH -C ENTURY B RITAIN 91 (2012).
54. G OURVISH , supra note 46, at 9–11.
55. R EED, supra note 46, at 1–14.
56. Id.
57. Gourvish, supra note 52, at 57–58.
58. Id. at 99; B ROADBRIDGE , supra note 46; M ICHIE , supra note 42, at 3–27; see also E.
VICTOR MORGAN & W. A. T HOMAS , T HE S TOCK EXCHANGE : ITS HISTORY AND F UNCTION
(1969); W. A. T HOMAS , THE P ROVINCIAL S TOCK EXCHANGES (1973); Moshe Buchinsky &
Ben Polak, The Emergence of a National Capital Market in England, 1710–1880, 53 J. ECON .
HIST . 1 (1993).
59. R.W. KOSTAL , L AW AND E NGLISH R AILWAY C APITALISM 1825–1875 (1994).
60. ALFRED D. C HANDLER , J R ., THE VISIBLE H AND : T HE MANAGERIAL R EVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN B USINESS 88 (1977). See also ALFRED D. C HANDLER , J R ., S CALE AND S COPE : THE
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL C APITALISM 1–3 (1990).
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They could potentially mediate conflicting claims and interests within this diverse enterprise.
During the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, several major legal systems divided the corporate form into two separate
forms: public corporations and private companies. Though both
forms share some common features, they also had distinctive features
that made each of them more amenable to solving different problems.
In Continental Europe, the legislatures created separate laws for private companies, which formed the two legal forms. Germany led the
way in 1892 by introducing the GmbH.61 France, inspired by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine (with GmbHs) in 1918, introduced the
SARL in 1925.62 In Britain, the split was achieved within the same
piece of legislation—the 1907 Companies Act.63 After the 1862
Companies Act, private companies began to develop from below, by
businesspersons and lawyers, using the contractual flexibility offered
by the Act and its default Table A bylaws. 64 The courts first recognized the private company in the famous Salomon v. Salomon House
of Lords decision in 1897.65 Later, the Companies Acts of 1900 and
1907 formally recognized the status of private companies. 66 Generally speaking, private companies gained increased governance flexibility, lower public disclosure requirements, and less formal procedures

61. The GmbH was introduced as an alternative to the German public corporation (the
AG) that had to meet lower minimum capitalization requirements and lower formalities. See
Timothy W. Guinnane, Using a New Legal Form: The GmbH from 1892 to World War I
(Yale Univ., Working Paper, 2010) [hereinafter Guinnane, New Legal Form] (permission to
cite received from author).
62. See Timothy Guinnane et al., Putting the Corporation in its Place, 3 ENTER . &
S OC ’Y 687, 690 (2007) [hereinafter Guinnane et al., Putting]; see also Timothy W. Guinnane
et al., Droit et capital à l’épreuve de l’histoire: l’essor des sociétés á responsibilité limitée,
(“Law and Capital Face the Test of History: The Development of the Limited Liability Company”), 63 ANNALES H.S.C. 73 (2008); Timothy Guinnane et al., Ownership and Control in
the Entrepreneurial Firm: An International History of Private Limited Companies (Yale
Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 959, 2007) [hereinafter Guinnane et al.,
Ownership and Control], available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp959.pdf or
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071007; Timothy W. Guinnane & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Making
Do with Imperfect Law: Small Firms in France and Germany, 1890–1935, 57 ENTREPRISES
ET HISTOIRE , no. 4, 2009, at 79 [hereinafter Guinnane & Rosenthal, Making Do with Imperfect Law].
63. Companies Act, 1907, 7 Edw.7, c. 50 (Eng.).
64. Guinnane et al., Ownership and Control, supra note 62, at 13–14. See also Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 (Eng.).
65. See Salomon v. A. Salomon, [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
66. Guinnane et al., Putting, supra note 62, at 704–08.
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in return for giving up the access to stock markets and to external
equity.67
Thus, the organizational menu in Germany, Britain, and France
expanded to include at least two options. Different firms seeking to
solve different problems selected either the private or the public corporation form, or remained sole proprietorships or partnerships. The
GmbH, Private Company, SARL, and LLC options were often incorporated for asset partitioning purposes or in order to solve intergenerational issues or control problems between shareholders.68 They do
not seem to fit the team production theory and, at least in some of
their manifestations, they fit agency theory.
The above examples demonstrate that the joint-stock business
corporation could be used to deal with three different problems:
agency in the case of the East India Company, asset partitioning in
the case of the Bank of England, and team production in the case of
the giant railway companies. Furthermore, two different organizational forms could deal with team production: family firms in the
case of textile and iron factories, and business corporations in the
case of railways. But the fact that the team production problem was
relevant for some corporations in the second half of the nineteenth
century does not mean that corporate boards were mediating it. The
existence of a problem was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. Boards needed the status, legal powers, and motivation to mediate.

67. The United States was the outlier. After a failed attempt at introducing private company-like Partnership Associations in 1870s Pennsylvania, it did not follow suit with the
other jurisdictions and did not introduce a split between public and private corporation law
until the second half of the twentieth century. The S Corporation was formed in 1950 with
mostly tax-related effects. Close Corporations chapters and supplements were included in the
general corporation laws from 1969 with Delaware as the first state to do so. A real distinction, based on a separate law, appeared for the first time only in 1977, when Wyoming enacted the first Limited Liability Companies Act. In the following decades, practically all U.S.
states enacted LLC laws. See, Timothy W. Guinnane, Ron Harris & Naomi R. Lamoreaux,
Contractual Freedom and the Evolution of Corporate Governance in Britain, 1862 to 1929
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20481, 2014) available at
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/amstdy/main/GHL,%20Contractual%20Freedom%20(18%20Sept%20
2013).pdf (forthcoming at the NBER Summer Institute meetings of the Development of the
American Economy program).
68. Guinnane, New Legal Form, supra note 61; Guinnane et al., Ownership and Control,
supra note 62; Guinnane & Rosenthal, Making Do with Imperfect Law, supra note 62;
Guinnane et al., Putting, supra note 62.
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III. DOCTRINAL HISTORY
Let us move from the history of the corporate form in solving
organizational problems to the legal history of specific corporate
structures and doctrines. For the team production theory to validly
explain the functioning of corporate boards as mediating hierarchies,
we must establish a few supporting doctrines. Doctrinal developments could lead to a theoretical shift. Conversely, a paradigm shift
from one theory, say agency, to another, say team production, could
enhance doctrinal change. Each can nourish the other simultaneously.
Did specific doctrines that support the team production develop before, in tandem, or after the formulation of the theory? To help answer this question, I will examine the doctrinal examples of separate
legal personality, the trust doctrine, and the business judgment rule,
which Blair and Stout offered in their seminal 1999 article.69
A. Separate Legal Personality
First, separate legal personality emerged.70 For directors not to
hold their full alliance to members, they needed another anchor—the
corporate entity. This separate legal personality developed as a key
characteristic of the corporation as early as the Middle Ages. New
College, mentioned in the Stout article, and the East India Company
are examples of the early corporations with a distinct legal personality. The corporation’s separate legal personality received its starkest
modern form in Salomon v. Salomon in 1897.71 This case recognized
in England the separation between a sole shareholder, who was also a
creditor, and the company in which he held shares.72 The case was
decided in the context of all private companies and at a time when
boards were considered to represent shareholders.73 Historically, legal personality was in place long before the team production theory
became viable.
Corporations in the second half of the nineteenth century were
not structured in a way that allowed the board of directors to serve as
mediators between stakeholders. This was primarily because board
members were expected to be major shareholders and not independ69.
70.
71.
72.

Blair & Stout, supra note 1.
Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 292–97.
Salomon v. A. Salomon, [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
Ron Harris, The Private Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862–1907, 33
OXFORD J. LEGAL S TUD . 339, 339–78 (2013).
73. M ORTON J. H ORWITZ , T RANSFORMATION OF A MERICAN L AW , 1870–1960: THE
C RISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 98–100 (1992).
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ent directors. Most public companies had relatively high qualification
requirements for directors in terms of minimum holdings of shares.
Directors were viewed as representing the shareholders and, as such,
were expected to be shareholders themselves.74 Late nineteenth century directors were considered to be agents of corporate shareholders.75 As representatives and agents of the shareholders, directors
could not serve as honest brokers. The dominant corporate personality theory of the time, the contractual or aggregate theory, put the ultimate controlling power of the corporation in the hands of the shareholders and equated the corporation with its shareholders.76 But this
too did not make the board the pivotal organ of the corporation.
Boards of directors did not attain this status until the merger movement at the turn of the twentieth century weakened the stance of
shareholders in their corporations and empowered directors. However, this process was lengthy and gradual, and it may have resulted, in
part, from the managers’ desire to escape from the control of shareholders.
B. The Trust Doctrine
According to the trust doctrine, the legal relationship between
directors and shareholders is similar to the legal relationship between
trustees and beneficiaries.77 The trust doctrine was first applied to
officers of unincorporated companies in the late eighteenth century
because they used the trust as a basic device for holding property on
behalf of their shareholders. The trust doctrine migrated to the corporate context and was applied to directors and officers in the middle of
the nineteenth century.78 Thus, from an early stage, directors were
committed to serving the interests of shareholders, like trustees to
beneficiaries. As long as this was the state of doctrine, directors
could not serve as mediators, even when they were not required to
own shares for board qualification.

74. This rationale goes back to the very first business corporations, such as the East
India Company and its contemporaries.
75. H ORWITZ , supra note 73.
76. Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 W ASH . & LEE L. R EV . 1421, 1462–78 (2006).
77. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 290–92.
78. H ARRIS , I NDUSTRIALIZING , supra note 17, at 137–67.
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C. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule developed gradually.79 The shielding of managerial decisions from judicial review during the lifetime
of the enterprise first developed in Britain in the equitable context of
partnerships, and made its way into the corporate context as early as
1843 in Foss v. Harbottle.80 This was an important first step in allowing directors a level of independence from shareholders.
The business judgment rule is an essential doctrine in the United States that can detach directors from shareholders. It gives directors immunity from shareholder intervention in decisions that favor
other constituencies. The history of the business judgment rule in the
United States still awaits a complete study of its origins. Yet we can
point to some significant cases. For example, the business judgment
rule was quite clearly stated as early as 1919 in Dodge v. Ford.81 In
the Unocal case of 1985, the court held that a board of directors may
only try to prevent a takeover where it can be shown that there was a
threat to corporate policy.82 In other words, the court was willing to
review the decision of a board in these circumstances, despite the
general applicability of the business judgment rule.83 In Van Gorkom,
also decided in 1985, the court found that the directors were grossly
negligent because they hastily approved a merger without substantial
inquiry or any expert advice.84 Though a well-developed business
judgment rule is a precondition for the application of the mediating
hierarchies theory, as Blair and Stout suggest, the timing of its development is not clear.85
As can be seen, different doctrines developed in different times.
Therefore, the doctrinal history does not define any specific period
when all the doctrinal pieces necessary to team production theory
matured. Let us move from the history of the doctrine to the history
of the theory itself.

79. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 299–305.
80. Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 2 Hare 461 (Eng.).
81. See generally Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Yet in the end,
the court intervened in Henry Ford’s business judgment with respect to investment, pricing,
and employment policy. Id.
82. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
83. Id.
84. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985).
85. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 299–305.
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IV. DYNAMICS OF CORPORATION THEORIES
Three preconditions are needed for the theory of team production to develop. First, corporations had to encounter team production
problems. Second, legal doctrine had to support the theory, for example, by positioning boards in a legal position in which they could
serve as mediators. Third, the previously dominant theory of the corporation, agency theory, had to be sufficiently undermined. In this
Part, we will follow the history of the team production theory of the
corporation and the theories that competed with it, primarily agency
theory. Let us begin in the early twentieth century, because before
that time the other preconditions were not met.
The canonic 1919 Dodge v. Ford case does not fit a mediating
board conception of the corporation.86 The issue was whether Henry
Ford and the board he controlled could promote a business strategy
that benefited consumers of Model T automobiles (by lowering its
price) and employees of the Ford Motor Company (by paying premium wages) at the expense of shareholders (the plaintiffs were large
shareholders).87 The Michigan Supreme Court stated in a very famous quote:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits,
or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes.88

This judgment upheld a shareholder value conception of the company
and undermined a conception that took into account the interests of
various other stakeholders.89
In the early 1930s, the Berle–Dodd debate about shareholder
versus stakeholder views of the firm raged, mostly in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review.90 The parties to the debate were two of the
86. See Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 684.
89. Some scholars interpreted the case as a business judgment rule case. Some believed
that Ford in fact intended to promote shareholders’ value in the longer term. For historical
discussions of the case see, for example, M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again:
Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, in C ORPORATE LAW S TORIES (J. Mark
Ramseyer ed., 2009).
90. See, e.g., A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV . L. R EV .
1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV .
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corporate law luminaries of the time: Adolf Berle, at the time professor at Columbia Law School, and Merrick Dodd, then a Harvard Law
School professor. 91 The Berle–Dodd controversy concerned the primary purpose of the publicly owned corporation.
Berle’s position was, in a nutshell, “that all powers granted to a
corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group
within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or
both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable
benefit of all shareholders . . . .”92 Dodd, on the other hand, argued
that since the corporation was viewed as a separate legal entity, the
directors were fiduciaries of the corporation and not of the shareholders, and as such, had to take into account other constituencies
and stakeholders and the society at large.93
We do not have to delve deeper into the arguments in the debate. It is sufficient for our purposes to establish that in the early
1930s there was a harsh debate between two paradigms and not dominance of a single paradigm. The first paradigm was the agency paradigm, according to which the main role of corporation law is to mitigate agency problems between shareholders and directors. The second is our very own team production paradigm. Not only did one of
the two paradigms—the shareholder primacy paradigm—not support
a team production theory of the corporation, but it also promoted its
competitor.
A team production model of the firm may have appeared with
“managerialism,” a concept that emerged in the 1930s and experienced a heyday in the 1950s and 1960s.94 At the core of
managerialism was the belief that large corporations were not only
rapidly growing to become, or already were, dominant economic and
L. R EV . 1145 (1932) [hereinafter Dodd, For Whom]; A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate
Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV . L. R EV . 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is
Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U.
C HI . L. R EV . 194 (1935); A DOLF A. B ERLE , J R . & G ARDINER C. M EANS, THE MODERN
C ORPORATION AND P RIVATE P ROPERTY (1932). But for a different interpretation of the debate in its historical context, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder
Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. C ORP . L. 99,
102 (2008).
91. See generally ‘Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr.’, Gale Encyclopedia of Biography in Context, Gale Document Number: GALE|BT2310017845; Edwin Merrick Dodd, WASHINGTON &
LEE U NIV . S CH . OF L., http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp?id=368 (last visited Nov.
24, 2014).
92. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, supra note 90, at 1050 (emphasis added).
93. Dodd, For Whom, supra note 90, at 1154.
94. See C HANDLER , THE VISIBLE HAND , supra note 60.
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social institutions, but also that they were being run by a new kind of
controller.95 Both optimistic and pessimistic views of managerialism
pointed to corporate managers as a central element in the new system.96 In the immediate postwar period, Peter Drucker wrote about
the internal life of corporate management and the need for a business
corporation to have “management whose responsibility is to the enterprise rather than to any one group: owners, workers, or consumers.”97 James Burnham’s work, The Managerial Revolution, sought to
express the movement of all functional power into the hands of managers rather than politicians or businessmen.98 He viewed corporate
managers as a new class in society, supplanting the capitalists of a
previous era. 99
The evidence suggests that, at least in their public pronouncements, corporate leaders voiced managerial views. Clearly, many
business leaders accepted some or all of the economic underpinnings
of managerialism. The idea became widespread in the postwar era, as
corporate leaders were increasingly depicted as balancing the demands of various corporate constituencies, including employees,
communities, consumers, and society in general.100 This was the first
time a fertile breeding ground for developing a team production theory of the corporation was in place. But in his famous 1970 New York
Times essay, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its
Profits, Milton Friedman stated in the most direct and powerful way
that:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct
the business in accordance with their desires, which generally
will be to make as much money as possible . . . .101

95. See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, the Cold
War, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. P A . J.
B US. L. 306, 326 (2013).
96. Id.
97. Peter F. Drucker, Structure of the Enterprise: Economic, Governmental, Social, 44
ILL . L. R EV . 769, 770 (1950).
98. See J AMES B URNHAM , THE MANAGERIAL R EVOLUTION (1960).
99. Id. at 96–112.
100. See Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 S EATTLE U. L. R EV .
1247 (2010); Wells, supra note 95, at 321.
101. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is
to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. T IMES , Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32–33.
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Friedman was, at the time, one of the most influential economists
globally, a leader of the Chicago School of Economics, a prominent
public figure and columnist, and soon to become a Nobel laureate.102
Considering Friedman’s strong criticism, clearly the team production
theory was still not the dominant theory of the 1970s. Or alternatively, it was already past its heyday.
Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article on agency cost theory was
another challenge.103 The theory placed the agency relationship between shareholders and managers, in the center of the analysis of the
corporation.104 It analyzed monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss.105 What is important for our context is the reception the
article received, not its details. The article became one of the most
cited articles in the field of economics.106 In the following four decades, it became one of the most canonic and influential articles in the
field of theory of the firm.
So far we have examined a few anecdotes along the twentieth
century, in which we encountered the persistence of agency theory
and its resistance to alternative theories. Let us use another method—
a more continuous one—for looking at the rise and decline of major
twentieth century paradigms of firm and corporate theory. The method is citation counting. In this case, it is based on Google Books.107

102. See generally L ANNY E BENSTEIN , M ILTON F RIEDMAN : A B IOGRAPHY (2007).
103. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. F IN . ECON . 305 (1976).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 308.
106. As of August 21, 2014, it had 44,422 citations in Google Scholar:
http://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=44R7TLwAAAAJ
&citation_for_view=44R7TLwAAAAJ:5qfkUJPXOUwC.
107. The graphs were produced using the Google Books Ngram Viewer. The Google
Books Ngram Viewer displays a graph showing how often the search phrases have occurred
in the period defined for search in the comprehensive corpus of books included in Google
Books. I compared the relevant terms and narrowed the results to the relevant time frame.
Finally, when necessary, I multiplied the graphs of the terms that were less common, so that
we can see their shape even when compared to terms that occurred more frequently.
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Let us understand the graphs. The first graph compares occurrence of team production theory and asset partitioning. We can see
that until the 2000s, the team production theory occurred more frequently. At the beginning of the 2000s, although the occurrence of
the team production theory kept rising steadily, asset partitioning
held prominence. At the end of the decade, the occurrence of asset
partitioning dropped dramatically.
The second graph compares occurrence of team production theory and agency theory. It is clear that throughout the time period,
agency theory appears much more frequently than team production
theory.
I am not sure how Blair and Stout would view the intellectual
history of thinking about team production theory. Did the theory enjoy a golden age between the 1930s and 1970s, during the heyday of
managerialism, and decline thereafter? Did the agency paradigm rise
to dominance for the first time after the seminal 1976 Jensen and
Meckling article to replace the seasoned team production theory? Or
did agency theory dominate throughout the twentieth century, with
team production theory of the corporation emerging for the first time
only very late in the century, in the 1990s, as Blair and Stout suggest
in their seminal article?108 As Blair and Stout note, several indications support their view.109 But there is also evidence of a different
trend. For example, Bebchuk’s Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard
and other shareholder democracy movements suggest the persistence
or reemergence of shareholder primacy and the agency-focused theory of the corporation.110 Or have agency theory and mediating hierarchies theory competed with each other throughout the century, with
some ups and downs?
V. CONCLUSION
The team production theory surely could not develop, even initially, before actual corporations dealt with team production problems. Theorizing problems such as this was not likely to occur before
the occurrence of the problem itself. As we saw in the first section,
the first complex multistakeholder corporations—the first corporations to encounter team production problems on a large scale—were
108. Blair & Stout, supra note 1.
109. Id. at 276–79, 289 n.90, 325, 328.
110. See, e.g., S HAREHOLDER R IGHTS P ROJECT , THE S HAREHOLDER R IGHTS P ROJECT
R EPORT FOR THE 2012 AND 2013 P ROXY S EASONS (2013), available at
http://srp.law.harvard.edu/releases/2012-13-Annual-Report.pdf.
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the railway companies. The next wave emerged from the Second Industrial Revolution, which gave rise to the steel, chemical, and automobile industries. These were the first large public industrial corporations. Before that period, most industrial firms that encountered
team production problems were not incorporated, as we saw in the
survey of the textile and iron industries, and dealt with the team production problem through other organizational means. Textile and iron
corporations involved in team production actually developed after the
middle of the nineteenth century, giant railway companies in the
third quarter of that century, and large industrial companies in the
fourth. But even then, not all public corporations experienced team
production problems as existential issues. Some, like the commenda
and the East India Company in their times, viewed agency problems
as their main concern. Many twentieth-century banking, financial,
and insurance companies, like the Bank of England, and the London
Assurance earlier, viewed asset partitioning and the management of
pools of assets and liabilities as their main tasks. We have also seen
that the various types of private companies that developed since the
late nineteenth century as an organizational form—distinct from the
public corporation—did not primarily aim to solve team production
problems.
Doctrinal and structural histories do not point to any welldefined period as the one when all the doctrinal pieces necessary to
team production theory matured. Some of the doctrines, notably separate legal personality, were in place by the late middle ages but nevertheless did not give rise to the team production theory. Some, like
the structural independence of the board, developed only in the first
half of the twentieth century. Yet others, such as the business judgment rule, experienced ups and downs until the 1980s and beyond.
Does one expect doctrine to change first from below, followed intuitively by, for instance, Delaware judges, and only then to be followed by the development of an organizing theory by academics such
as Blair and Stout? Or do we expect theory to change first and then
the courts to settle disputes and develop the common law based on
the theory as an organizing rationale?
The intellectual history of the two competing theories, agency
and team production, over the twentieth century is quite complex.
What I did in this Essay was offer only a very narrow narrative based
on a few familiar manifestations, not a thick intellectual history
based on thorough research. Based on this sketch, it seems as though,
rather than witnessing a single, one-directional paradigm shift from
team production to agency, or vice versa, we are in fact witnessing
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an ongoing competition between two theories, two paradigms. The
Great Depression led to a major debate as to the social and economic
role of the business corporation. The heyday of managerialism in the
postwar period could have given rise to team production theory, but
it did not. The growing criticism of executives and of the actual
achievements of agency theory in the 1990s and 2000s did give rise
to team production theory, but did not lead to the demise of agency
theory.
To conclude, I would like to put forward three arguments. I
would like to urge Blair and Stout and other scholars examining this
issue to provide a more precise historical narrative of the timing and
causes of the development of the mediating hierarchies theory and its
supporting doctrines. For now, and based on my preliminary historical study, I would like to put forward the hypothesis that agency theory and team production theory have existed in parallel for much of
the past century.
I would like to suggest that business organizations are highly
heterogeneous and the problems addressed by their entrepreneurs and
investors change over time and among sectors and contexts. The public corporation is an institution that can and does solve more than one
problem. Team production, agency, and asset partitioning problems
can all be mitigated by differently functioning and differently structured corporations. Consequently, it appears that the team production
model is very insightful for understanding what is going on in some
corporations, but not in others.
The normative question of whether it is efficient and desirable
from a social engineering perspective to use the same organizational
form—the business corporation—to solve different problems, namely
agency, team production, and asset partitioning, is still very much
open in my judgment. On one hand, because the corporation is used
more often and it is deployed to solve several problems, many players invest in the development of the business corporation. Network
externalities are being created. On the other hand, one size does not
fit all. There are rigidities. There are advantages to having a menu of
options, different platforms for private and public corporations, for
shareholder-controlled and for director-mediated corporations. Maybe different organizational forms could be designed to better solve
different organizational problems. A systematic normative analysis
will have to await another opportunity.

